






## MOTIVATION



## SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE




## TRY CPV!



Artifact DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.10063681



## STRATEGY FOR SV-COMP 2024

CPV runs a sequential portfolio consisting of property-directed reachability (PDR) [8], interpolation-based model checking (IMC) [11],  $k$ -induction (KI) [14], and bounded model checking (BMC) [6].



## EVALUATION RESULTS AT SV-COMP 2024

6th, 3rd, and 2nd place in *ReachSafety*, *ReachSafety-ECA*, *ReachSafety-Hardware*, respectively



## SUMMARY

- It is feasible to utilize sequential circuits as intermediate representations for software verification
- CPV can employ different hardware verifiers as the backend
- CPV competed well against other mature verifiers in SV-COMP
- Future work:
  - Support more verification properties (e.g., no-overflow and termination)
  - Export correctness witnesses
  - Incorporate more backend verifiers
  - Apply circuit optimization to improve the performance of verification

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