


EBF 4.2: Black-Box Cooperative Verification for Concurrent Programs

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Introduction

- **Concurrency** is prevalent in present-day software systems.

- computer games
- ticket reservation systems
- online banking
- auto-pilots
- ...



- Ensuring the **correctness** and **safety** of **concurrent** programs is crucial
 - Software failures may lead to significant financial losses and affect people's well-being.

Verification of concurrent programs


Testing and verifying concurrent programs is an inherently **difficult task**

- Different possible threads' interleavings make the program execution **non-deterministic**:
 - Some bugs may occur only for a specific **thread's order**
- Existing techniques often have various theoretical and practical **limitations**

The main idea of **cooperative verification** is to implement a **communication interface** between different tools, which allows the exchange of **partial verification results**

EBF Cooperative Approach

In **EBF** we implement an open-source¹ tool combining **BMC** and **fuzzing**



1. <https://github.com/fatimahkj/EBF>

Stage 1: Safety Proving

- Here EBF calls the **BMC** engine for the given program.
 - It produces one of the three possible verdicts: **Safe**, **Bug**, or **Unknown**.
 - This is the **only** time when EBF can prove **program safety**
- If the BMC tool returns **Bug**, it generates a **counter-example**
 - a **sequence** of **program inputs** and a **thread schedule** leading to the vulnerability
 - all produced counter-examples are saved for further use

Counterexample:

State 5 file test.c line 9 function foo thread 1

a = 42 (00000000 00000000 00000000 00101010)

State 6 file test.c line 10 function foo thread 1

b = 0 (00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000)

State 7 file test.c line 5 function reach_error thread 1

Violated property:

file test.c line 5 function reach_error

assertion 0

0

VERIFICATION FAILED

Stage 2: Seeds Generation

- This is introduced in **EBF 4.2**
- For each conditional branch (i.e., **if**, **else**, **while**, **for**, ...) in the program:
 1. Inject an error statement (i.e., **assert(0)**) inside the branch
 2. Run the **BMC** tool on the newly **instrumented** program
 3. If BMC returns **Bug**, then convert the **counter-example** into a **seed** for the fuzzer
 4. Otherwise (**Safe**, **Unknown** or **timeout**), move to the next branch in the program and go to Step 1.
- The seed generating continues until **all injected errors** have been detected or the **stage timeout** has been reached.
- The generated seeds greatly **improve** the fuzzer performance in the next stage.

Stage 3: Falsification

- **EBF** checks whether the program contains any vulnerabilities by **fuzzing**
- Out of the box fuzzers (i.e., **libFuzz**, **AFL**) are not suitable for testing concurrent programs
 - They do not have access to different **thread schedules**
- We implement and use **OpenGBF** – open-source grey-box fuzzer
 - Based on **AFL++** (thread-safe version of **AFL**)
 - It injects **delay functions** after every instruction in the program via an **LLVM pass**
 - Different **delay values** enforce different **thread schedules**
 - The **delay values** and the **program inputs** are “sampled” by **AFL++** using previously generated **seeds**
 - Other instrumentations are applied to generate counter-examples, ensure atomic execution, etc.

Stage 4: Results Aggregation

- **EBF** produces a verification **verdict** and a **bug trace** (if either tool returns **Bug**)

<i>Results Aggregation Stage</i>			
		OpenGBF	
		Bug	Unknown
BMC	Safe	<i>Conflict</i>	<i>Safe</i>
	Bug	<i>Unsafe</i>	<i>Unsafe</i>
	Unknown	<i>Unsafe</i>	<i>Unknown</i>

- When one of the tools returns **Unknown**, **EBF** relies on the verdict of the other one
- When the **BMC** tool returns **Safe**, and **OpenGBF** outputs **Bug**, **EBF** reports **Conflict**
 - This requires analysing the bug trace produced by **OpenGBF**
 - The **BMC** tool can be wrong due to **over-approximations**
 - **OpenGBF** can be wrong due with respect to the given **property** (i.e., something else causes the crash)

EBF 4.0 with different BMC tools

Experimental Setup:

- **BMC** 6 min + **OpenGBF** 5 min + **results Aggregation** 4 min = 15 min.
- **RAM limit** is 15 GB per Benchexec run.
- **ConcurrencySafety main** from SV-COMP 2022.
 - Witness validation switched off.
- Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS with 160 GB RAM and 25 cores

		EBF and BMC tools							
		EBF	Deagle	EBF	Cseq	EBF	ESBMC	EBF	CBMC
Results	Correct True	240	240	172	177	65	70	139	146
	Correct False	336	319	333	313	308	268	320	303
	Incorrect True	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Incorrect False	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
	Overall	816	799	677	667	438	376	598	547

- EBF4.0 **increases** the number of **found bugs** in comparison to the individual BMC tools.
- Overall, EBF4.0 provides a better **trade-off** between **bug finding** and **safety proving** than each BMC engine

EBF 4.2 in SV-COMP 2023

In EBF 4.2 we used **ESBMC** as BMC engine

- **ESBMC** 6 min + **Seed Generation** 1 min+ **OpenGBF** 5 min + **results Aggregation** 3 min = 15 min.

EBF 4.2 participated in concurrencySafety main

Results	EBF	ESBMC
Correct True	67	71
Correct False	251	236
Incorrect True	0	1
Incorrect False	1	0
Overall	369	346

Limitations

- 1) **The order** of the values in the counter example is **not** always the same as their order in the program.
- 2) Some benchmarks can contain **multiple different bugs**, which is **fine** for static analysis tools (BMC) but **not suitable** for dynamic analysis tools (e.g., one bug is always triggered before the other).
- 3) EBF4.2 only offered partial support for **data race detection** because ESBMC does not yet maintain full support for this property.
- 4) EBF4.2 does not yet support the detection of **arithmetic overflows** and **memory safety violations** as required by the competition format.

Reference

- [1] F. K. Aljaafari, R. Menezes, E. Manino, et al., “***Combining bmc and fuzzing techniques for finding software vulnerabilities in concurrent programs***,” IEEE Access, vol. 10, pp. 121 365–121 384, 2022. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3223359

- [2] F. Aljaafari, F. Shmarov, E. Manino, et al., “***EBF 4.2: Black-Box cooperative verification for concurrent programs (competition contribution)***,” in Proc. TACAS (2), ser. LNCS, Springer, 2023

Thank you