{ "Supreme": [ { "OpinionID": "A-61/62-17", "ID": "080333", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_61_62_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/17/2019", "Summary": "", "Title": "L.R. v. Camden City Public School District (080333)(Camden, Morris, and Somerset Counties and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-30-18", "ID": "081607", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_30_18.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/16/2019", "Summary": "
The Court does not agree that the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s CEPA claim related to the alleged refusal to destroy documents, but affirms as to the fraudulent timekeeping allegations.
", "Title": "Sergeant First Class Frank Chiofalo v. State of New Jersey (081607)(Mercer County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "D-126-17", "ID": "081035", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/d_126_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/15/2019", "Summary": "Because the Utah court limited the presentation of evidence of a business dispute between respondent and the law firm, and because evidence that may exist in Utah cannot be compelled by respondent here, the Court cannot conclude that the OAE has proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly misappropriated law firm funds under circumstances justifying greater discipline than that imposed in Utah.
", "Title": "In the Matter of Joseph Peter Barrett, an Attorney at Law (081035)(Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-25/26-18", "ID": "081545", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_25_26_18.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/26/2019", "Summary": "No reasonable trier of fact could find that Arthur knew or had special reason to know that Kenneth was engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor. Accordingly, Arthur had no duty to report Kenneth. The record similarly fails to provide a basis for liability to attach to GEM. Because the record here is determinative of Arthur’s and GEM’s liability, the Court need not decide whether a co-worker or employer with knowledge or a special reason to know that a co-worker or employee is engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor has a legal duty to report that co-worker or employee.
", "Title": " G.A.-H. v. K.G.G.(081545)(Ocean County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-32-18", "ID": "081723", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_32_18.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/24/2019", "Summary": "Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, the Court finds that the Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency requirement to receive survivor benefits. The Court’s finding is consistent with the PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of deceased PFRS members.
", "Title": "S.L.W. v. New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (081723) (Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-37-17", "ID": "079832", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_37_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/19/2019", "Summary": "The Court has significant concerns about the procedure followed in this case. Neither the script set forth on the Miranda card nor the detective’s statement to defendant addressed whether defendant agreed to waive his rights before answering questions. However, any error in the trial court’s admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the State presented overwhelming independent evidence of defendant’s guilt. And, although the State should have moved to dismiss the charges on which the jury had deadlocked before the court considered evidence relevant to those charges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying three aggravating factors to impose an extended-term sentence at the high end of the statutory range.
", "Title": " State v. Kareem T. Tillery (079832) (Essex County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-77-17", "ID": "080758", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_77_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/18/2019", "Summary": "The Court defers to the trial judge’s determination that the disputed footage was played for the jury during the State’s case-in-chief and notes that defense counsel consented to the admission of the surveillance footage depicting the moments surrounding the shooting, including the video segment at issue. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to play the video segment during his closing remarks, and the prosecutor’s comments were reasonable and fair inferences supported by the evidence presented at trial.
", "Title": "State v. Rasul McNeil-Thomas (080758) (Essex County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-72-17", "ID": "081135", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_72_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/17/2019", "Summary": "The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility.
", "Title": "In the Matter of Corey Corbo, Union City Police Department (081005) (Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-11-18", "ID": "081135", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_11_18.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/10/2019", "Summary": "The circumstances at issue in McKenney, which heavily depended on the prejudice caused to the party disadvantaged by the surprise change in trial testimony, are distinguishable from the change in testimony here. Here there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard does not compel reversal, especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic. Under the circumstances, T.L. is not entitled to a new trial.
", "Title": "T.L. v. Jack Goldberg, M.D.(081135) (Middlesex County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-3/4-18", "ID": "080394", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_3_4_18.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/05/2019", "Summary": "The trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court’s precedent compels only one conclusion: an arbitrator must resolve plaintiffs’ claims about the validity of their sales contracts as well as any arbitrability claims that plaintiffs may choose to raise.
", "Title": "Janell Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp; Sasha Robinson and Tijuana Johnson v. Mall Chevrolet (081258) (Camden County and Statewide)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-49-17", "ID": "080394", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/supreme/a_49_17.pdf", "PublishDate": "06/04/2019", "Summary": "The Court answers both parts of the first certified question in the affirmative: a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured does violate the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void at the outset. In response to the second question, a party may be entitled to a refund of premium payments it made on the policy, depending on the circumstances.
", "Title": "Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Wells Fargo Bank NA (080669) (Statewide)" }], "Published_Appellate": [ { "OpinionID": "A-3737-17T2", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a3737-17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/17/2019", "Title": "ANASIA MAISON VS. NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL. (L-3535-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)", "Summary": "" }, { "OpinionID": "A-5150-16T1", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a5150-16.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/12/2019", "Title": "IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)", "Summary": "The court held that the Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission was authorized to approve the creation of a new job title and did not act arbitrarily in approving the title at issue in this case.
" }, { "OpinionID": "A-2342-17T3", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a2342-17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/11/2019", "Title": "CHARLES L. BOVE VS. AKPHARMA INC., ET AL. (L-0982-15, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)", "Summary": "In this appeal, the court considered whether an employee could seek damages from a former employer in a civil suit or was limited to recovery under the Workers Compensation Act (WCA) for injuries allegedly sustained from use of a nasal spray product developed by the employer. The court also examined whether frivolous litigation sanctions could be imposed, absent a finding the employee's attorneys acted in bad faith, particularly when the prevailing party's \"safe harbor\" letter failed to alert the employee's attorneys about the immunity.bar under the WCA and the prevailing party's initial motion for summary judgment was denied on all but one cause of action. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the employer's favor, due to the employee's inability to demonstrate his employer had committed an \"intentional wrong\" under the two-prong test outlined in Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,101 N.J. 161, 178-79 (1985) and reversed the frivolous litigation sanction
" }, { "OpinionID": "A-5177-17T2", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a5177-17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/11/2019", "Title": "ROBERT CAMERON, ETC. VS. SOUTH JERSEY PUBS, INC., D/B/A TGI FRIDAY'S, INC. (L-2106-14, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)", "Summary": "this appeal, plaintiff's claims were similar to those considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24 (2017), as they related to defendant's sale of beverages from menus that did not include prices for the items sold. The court's majority determined that the Law Division improperly denied plaintiff's motion for class certification under Rule 4:32-1(b)(2). The majority concluded that the concerns raised by the Dugan Court about class certification under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) of claims for damages under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210, and the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18, did not apply to plaintiff's class action for injunctive relief under (b)(2) in this case.
According to the majority neither the Dugan's Court's concern about whether plaintiff could make a showing that members of the putative class sustained an ascertainable loss under the CFA, nor its trepidation that certifying a (b)(3) class exposed the Dugan defendant to a disproportional amount of civil penalties under the TCCWNA were considerations applicable to plaintiff's motion in this case. Here, the majority held that in determining whether cohesiveness existed among class members, the trial court should have considered whether the remedy sought would be applicable to all members or to none of them.
The dissenting opinion concludes that the trial court correctly denied the motion for class certification under Rule 4:32-1(b)(2). According to the dissent, certification of the class for the CFA claims was not warranted because plaintiff would be required to establish that all members of the class sustained a bona fide ascertainable loss, which is an essential element of a claim under the CFA. Such claims are not cohesive since they depend on the individual's experience in purchasing beverages at defendant's restaurants. The claims under the TCCWNA also lack cohesion because relief could only be awarded to members of the class are \"aggrieved consumers,\" and such claims also are dependent upon the class members' personal experiences.
" }, { "OpinionID": "A-3073-17T1", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a3073-17.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/10/2019", "Title": "FRANK HOLTHAM, JR. VS. KATHERINE LUCAS (FM-02-1695-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)", "Summary": "In this post-judgment matrimonial case, the trial court imposed a penalty on plaintiff, in accord with his matrimonial settlement agreement (MSA), for violating one of the MSA's terms. On appeal from the award, plaintiff invoked the contract law principle that bars, as an unenforceable penalty, liquidated damages that unreasonably exceed normally compensable contract damages. The court concludes that the contract rule against penalties does not apply with equal force to MSAs. The court emphasizes that family judges retain the authority to modify an MSA's penalty provision to assure fairness and equity. Since no modification was warranted under the facts of the case, the court affirms the penalty award.
" }, { "OpinionID": "A-1862-18T1", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a1862-18.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/08/2019", "Title": "F.K. VS. INTEGRITY HOUSE, INC., ET AL. (L-2239-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)", "Summary": "Plaintiff F.K. appeals the trial court's December 11, 2018 order granting summary judgment to defendant Integrity House and dismissing her complaint with prejudice. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to immunity from plaintiff's negligence action under New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act (\"the Act\"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the amount of private contributions received by defendant, roughly $250,000 or 1.26% of annual revenue, is too insignificant to entitle defendant to charitable immunity.
\"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all affirmative defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion.\" Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cty., Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2002). The court concludes that defendant did not present sufficient evidence to support its entitlement to the affirmative defense of charitable immunity. The summary judgment record does not allow for a conclusive determination as to the source and use of Integrity House's funding. Therefore, the court is unable to determine whether Integrity House receives substantial funding from private contributions or relieves the government from a burden it would otherwise have to perform, as is required to be entitled to charitable immunity.In addition, although a determination of the specific percentage of funding Integrity House receives from private contributions is not necessary for the court's analysis, the court notes that no published case has granted charitable immunity to a non-religious, non-educational entity with such a small portion of funding from private contributions.
Accordingly, the court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment." }], "Unpublished_Appellate": [ { "OpinionID": "A-4794-15T2", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/unpublished/a4794-15.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/17/2019", "Title": "LISA R. EASLEY VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (L-0094-13, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-2361-16T4", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/unpublished/a2361-16.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/17/2019", "Title": "IN THE MATTER OF CITY OF PERTH AMBOY AND PERTH AMBOY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION LOCAL 13 (NEW JERSEY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION)" }, { "OpinionID": "A-4517-16T2", "DocumentURL": "/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/unpublished/a4517-16.pdf", "PublishDate": "07/17/2019", "Title": "STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVON M. GORDON (14-06-1582, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)" }] }